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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent proliferation of embedded systems has generated a bold new paradigm, known 
as open embedded systems. While traditional embedded systems provide only closed 
base applications (natively-installed software) to users, open embedded systems allow 
the users to freely execute open applications (additionally-installed software) in order to 
meet various user requirements, such as user personalization and device coordination. 
Key to the success of platforms required for open embedded systems is the 
achievement of both the scalable extension of base applications and the secure 
execution of open applications. Most existing platforms, however, have focused on 
either scalable or secure execution, limiting their applicability.  
This dissertation presents a new secure platform using multi-core processors, which 
achieves both scalability and security. Four techniques feature the new platform: (1) 
seamless communication, by which legacy applications designed for a single processor 
make it possible to be executed on multiple processors without any software 
modifications; (2) secure processor partitioning with hardware support, by which 
Operating Systems (OSs) required for base and open applications are securely executed 
on separate processors; (3) asymmetric virtualization, by which many OSs over the 
number of processors are securely executed under secure processor partitioning; and (4) 
secure dynamic partitioning, by which the number of processors allocated to individual 
OSs makes it possible to be dynamically changed under secure processor partitioning.  
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1. 
CHAPTER 1                       
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of open embedded systems, and clarifies our 
research contributions. 
 
1.1 OPEN EMBEDDED SYSTEMS 
Recent proliferation of embedded systems has generated a bold new paradigm, 
known as open embedded systems [Intel 06] [NTT 04a] [NTT 04b]. While traditional 
embedded systems provide only closed base applications (i.e., natively-installed 
software, such as mailer and browser in mobile phones) to users, open embedded 
systems allow the users to freely execute open applications (i.e., additionally-installed 
software that includes user-level programs, libraries, and device drivers) as well as base 
applications. Open applications may be downloaded from any web sites in order to add 
various functionalities to embedded systems. They also may communicate with other 
embedded systems in order to offer device coordination to users.  
FIGURE 1.1 shows three useful service examples of open embedded systems. The 
first service example is a driver-assist service, in which a drive recorder equipped with a 
car stores a lot of driving information in coordination with a notification event sent from 
a car navigation system when the car approaches an accident-prone area. The second 
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service example is a virtual-terminal service, in which a user makes it possible to 
virtually use multiple mobile terminals for private and business scenes on a physical 
terminal by means of the free install of carrier software packages. The last service 
example is an anti-crime service, in which a child’s mobile phone automatically calls an 
emergency contact number (e.g, a home number) in coordination with a notification 
event sent from town’s monitoring cameras when town’s monitoring cameras detect that 
a child is moving out of town. Leveraging open applications, open embedded systems 
make it possible to meet various user requirements, such as user personalization and 
device coordination, unlike traditional embedded systems. 
 
Car 
navigation
system
Drive
Recorder
Caution:
accident-
prone area
Store
driving
information
PDA
Phone
Monitor
Parent
Child Movingout of town!
Private Business
One physical terminal
Free install of
terminal software
(1) Driver-assist service
(2) Virtual-terminal service (3) Anti-crime service
Camera
 
FIGURE 1.1: EXAMPLES OF OPEN EMBEDDED SYSTEMS 
 
Open applications need to be executed on the same platform as base applications 
since the open applications that we target include device drivers as well as user-level 
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programs by definition. This requirement of open embedded systems indicate that open 
embedded systems need to support at least two isolated execution environments (i.e., 
domains) for the separate execution of base and open applications. A domain is here 
defined as an execution environment formed on a native OS. While a base domain 
executes base applications, an open domain executes a group of open applications. 
Further, additional open domains may be required in order to isolate many groups of 
open applications themselves. FIGURE 1.2 summarizes the features of open embedded 
systems. 
 
Open
apps..
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(Installed)
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apps.
Base
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Open
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Open
apps.
Base
apps..
Base
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Open
domains
Open embedded system
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FIGURE 1.2: FEATURES OF OPEN EMBEDDED SYSTEMS 
 
In order to deploy this new paradigm on traditional embedded systems, platforms 
used for open embedded systems require the achievement of the following design 
objectives: 
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• Scalable1 functionality for base applications: The major driving force of 
embedded systems still enriches the functionality of base applications in order to 
maximize user experience. The development costs of base applications, however, 
would seem to reach an extraordinarily-high value since the number of lines of 
source codes required for base applications rapidly increase [Morgan 04]. The 
platforms used for open embedded systems also need to support the scalable 
extension of base applications in a cost-effective way. 
 
• Hardened security for open applications: The flexibility of open embedded 
systems would seem to result in a two-edged blade because new groups of open 
applications might contain bugs or viruses. FIGURE 1.3 shows the recent trends 
in viruses for mobile terminals. As shown in this figure, the number of mobile 
viruses rapidly increases [Gostev 06] [Gostev 07]. This means that base 
applications must be clearly protected from malicious open applications in order 
to maintain the minimum functionality of embedded systems. In addition, open 
embedded systems need to securely isolate many groups of open applications in 
order to prevent mutual interference among the application groups. 
 
• Base features for embedded systems: Unlike traditional computing systems, 
embedded systems need to be able to operate with limited resources. Open 
embedded systems also require the careful consideration for base features, such 
as performance overhead and memory footprint. 
                                                  
1 The word “scalability” means the extensibility to various technical attributes, such as 
the number of processors, functionalities, and the number of clients. 
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FIGURE 1.3: TRENDS IN MOBILE VIRUSES 
 
1.2 SECURITY MODEL 
Two aspects help classify security required for embedded systems: data security 
and program security. The goal of data security is the protection of the integrity and 
privacy of confidential data. Much work on data security, such as XOM [Lie 00], 
AEGIS [Suh 05], TPM [TCG 06], and SENSS [Zhang 05] helps prevent untrusted 
software executed on a processor from stealing private keys or modifying applications 
and OSs. 
The goal of program security is the protection of the correct execution of programs. 
We classify attacks against program security into two directions: vertical attacks and 
horizontal attacks. Vertical attacks are ones that try to take control of programs on other 
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domains by exploiting the vulnerability of the underlying platform. For example, the 
vulnerability of the ptrace system call allowed processes to obtain root privileges on 
Linux OS (version 2.4.18). Horizontal attacks are ones that try to change control flows 
of programs on other domains by means of inter-program communication. For example, 
the vulnerability of Apache web servers (version 1.3.24) allowed web clients to modify 
web contents because the web servers had a software flow that misinterpreted invalid 
requests encoded using chunked encoding.  
 
Program A
Program B
Underlying platform
(e.g., OS)
Horizontal attacks via
inter-program 
communication
Vertical attacks via
underlying platform
 
FIGURE 1.4: SECURITY MODEL 
 
This dissertation focuses on the program security which blocks vertical attacks. A 
security capability which makes underlying platform more secure is most important for 
the execution of open applications. Without the security capability, open embedded 
systems would seem to fail to execute any class of open applications (e.g., device 
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drivers) on native OSs since vertical attacks launched from malicious open applications 
make it possible to compromise the native OSs. In addition, other security capabilities 
which help enhance both data security and program security against horizontal attacks 
would seem to fail to be trustworthily implemented without reliable underlying 
platform. 
 
1.3 CHALLENGES 
Various electric hardware components, such as processors, memories and I/Os, 
form the basis of platforms for open embedded systems. In particular, processor 
architecture becomes an important factor in meeting the above requirements of open 
embedded systems since the architecture directly involves with the execution of both 
base and open applications. 
In recent trends of processor architecture, multi-core processors would seem to be 
one promising technology direction. A multi-core processor is defined as a processor 
which contains multiple cores (processors) in a chip. Conventional single-core 
processors need to operate at a high clock frequency in order to provide sufficient 
performance to both base and open applications, which makes it difficult to reduce 
power dissipation. By way of contrast, multi-core processors enable the desired level of 
performance to be achieved with a number of processors that operate at moderate clock 
frequencies, which helps to keep power dissipation low [Torii 05]. 
From the software point of view, processing on multi-core processors is classified 
into two types (see FIGURE 1.5): (a) Asymmetric Multi-Processing (AMP) and (b) 
Symmetric Multi-Processing (SMP) [Sakai 07] [Sakai 08].  
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FIGURE 1.5: TWO TYPES OF MULTI-PROCESSING 
 
With AMP, multiple OSs are executed on different processors. Various tasks are 
fixedly assigned to each processor. While multiple OSs help separate the execution of 
base applications from that of open applications, the OSs make it difficult for legacy 
base applications designed for a single-core processor to be executed over multiple 
processors without any software modifications. This means that AMP improves the 
secure execution of open applications, sacrificing the scalable extension of base 
applications. It should be noted that AMP still provides vulnerable protection among 
OSs since malicious open applications make it possible to exploit the security holes of 
OSs. 
With SMP, a single OS manages multiple processors. The OS enables tasks to be 
transparently executed over multiple processors. While legacy base applications 
designed for a single-core processor are executed over multiple processors without any 
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software modifications, a single OS results in causing mutual interference among base 
and open applications. This means that SMP improves the scalable extension of base 
applications, limiting the secure execution of open applications. 
Moreover, both AMP and SMP have a common concern about the support of many 
domains (i.e., OSs) used for various groups of open applications. While AMP needs to 
increase the number of processors for the support of many OSs, SMP supports only a 
single OS in a system. In order to cope with this issue, virtualization would seem to be a 
good solution. Conventional virtualization technologies, however, have a degree of 
security vulnerability [Hacker 07]. In addition, the technologies unfit for embedded 
systems in terms of base features, such as performance overhead and memory footprint, 
since traditional virtualization technologies have been originally developed for 
computing systems.  
From the above discussion, use of traditional multi-core processors poses major 
challenges to the achievement of open embedded systems since neither AMP nor SMP 
is in itself satisfactory.  
 
1.4 STATE OF THE ART 
Existing research on multi-core processors, however, has satisfied the requirements 
on neither scalable nor secure execution. In terms of scalable execution of base 
applications, the techniques used for traditional platforms [Accetta 86] [Fleisch 86] 
[Maloy 04] [MPI 97] [Mullender 90] [OMG 04] [Paulin 06] [Rozier 88] [Sharif 99] 
[Steen 99] [Tan 02] require a wide range of software modifications for either OSs or 
applications. This software incompatibility prevents the scalable extension of base 
applications especially on AMP. Moreover, in terms of secure execution of open 
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applications, the techniques used for traditional platforms [Armstrong 05] [Barham 03] 
[Baratloo 00] [Chen 08] [Cowan 98] [Dike 00] [Evans 02] [Fortify 09] [Gondo 07] 
[Gong 03] [Johnson 07] [Loscocco 01] [Neiger 06] [Openwall 01] [Qualcomm 04] 
[Seshadri 07] [Shinagawa 09] [Sugerman 01] [Whitaker 02] still have potential 
vulnerability on both AMP and SMP because the platforms provide only software-based 
protection.  
 
TABLE 1.1: STATE OF THE ART 
Requirements Items AMP SMP 
Problem Unsolved Solved 
Scalable extension of 
base applications Reason 
A wide range of  
software modifications
 
Problem Unsolved Unsolved Secure execution of 
open applications Reason Only software-based protection 
 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The primary contributions of this dissertation are the attainment of a multi-core 
processor platform for open embedded systems. Our multi-core processor platform 
addresses the challenges of both AMP and SMP in order to achieve both the scalable 
extension of base applications and the secure execution of open applications. FIGURE 
1.6 summarizes the qualitative advantage of our multi-core processor platform, 
compared with existing work. Four innovative techniques feature our platform: 
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FIGURE 1.6: CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR MULTI-CORE PROCESSOR PLATFORM 
 
• We propose a software approach for seamless communication, by which legacy 
base applications designed for a single-core processor make it possible to be 
executed over multiple processors without any software modifications [Inoue 
09b]. In this way, our platform achieves the scalable extension of base 
applications even on AMP. 
 
• We present a hardware-supported approach for secure processor partitioning, by 
which OSs are mutually protected on separate processors [Inoue 06a] [Inoue 
08b]. For the secure execution of open applications, this processor partitioning 
bases our platform formed on SMP as well as AMP. 
 
• We provide a new type of virtualization, known as asymmetric virtualization, by 
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which many OSs over the number of processors are securely executed under 
secure processor partitioning [Inoue 06b] [Inoue 08a]. This virtualization helps 
provide many secure domains on AMP and SMP for the secure execution of 
many groups of open applications since it fits for embedded systems. 
 
• We propose secure dynamic partitioning as an extension of secure processor 
partitioning, by which the number of processors allocated to individual OSs 
makes it possible to be dynamically changed on SMP under secure processor 
partitioning [Inoue 07] [Inoue 09a]. In this way, our platform achieves the secure 
execution of open applications even on SMP. 
 
1.6 ORGANIZATION  
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 introduces our base platform for open embedded systems. It turns out 
that our platform enables the achievement of both the scalable execution of base 
applications and the secure execution of open applications.  
Chapters 3 through 6 present the detailed design of four innovative techniques with 
respect to (1) seamless communication, (2) secure processor partitioning, (3) 
asymmetric virtualization, and (4) secure dynamic partitioning. Evaluations also 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the four techniques.  
Chapter 7 concludes the research contributions presented in this dissertation. 
TABLE 1.2 summarizes the overview of our four new techniques, clarifying the 
requirements of open embedded systems, the issues that traditional multi-core processor 
platforms have, and the effects of the innovative techniques. 
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TABLE 1.2: SUMMARY OF FOUR NEW TECHNIQUES 
Requirements Items AMP SMP 
Issue 
A wide range of  
software modifications
 
Technique
Seamless  
communication 
 
Effect 
No need for  
software modifications
 
Scalable extension of 
base applications 
Chapter Chapter 3  
Issue Security holes exploited by open applications 
Technique
Secure processor 
partitioning 
Secure dynamic 
partitioning 
Effect 
Hardware-level  
secure protection 
multiple domains under
hardware-level  
secure protection 
Secure execution of 
open applications 
(for new groups) 
Chapter Chapter 4 Chapter 6 
Issue Failure to support many open domains securely
Technique Asymmetric virtualization 
Effect Secure support of many domains 
Secure execution of 
open applications 
(for many groups) 
Chapter Chapter 5 
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2. 
CHAPTER 2                         
BASE PLATFORM 
 
This chapter describes the structures of our base platform for open embedded systems, 
and clarifies how our new techniques work on multi-core processors. 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
FIGURE 2.1 illustrates the structural overview of our base platform featured by 
both hardware and software. The hardware structure uses a multi-core processor. By 
definition, while a base domain executes base applications, maintaining at least one 
processor; an open domain executes a group of open applications, based on the 
classification of open applications. 
Our base platform supports two execution modes: a highly-functional mode and a 
multi-functional mode. A highly-functional mode executes only a base domain in order 
to maximize user experience of an embedded system. By way of contrast, a 
multi-functional mode executes a base domain and open domains in order to add 
various functionalities to the embedded system. In response to user requests and 
environmental events, the platform dynamically switches the two execution modes, 
coordinating with the hardware and software structures. In this way, our base platform 
achieves the functions required for open embedded systems.  
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FIGURE 2.1: BASE PLATFORM 
 
2.2 HARDWARE STRUCTURE 
FIGURE 2.2 shows an example of a multi-core processor used for our hardware 
structure. By definition, a multi-core processor provides multiple processors (e.g., four 
processors in the figure) in a chip. Most importantly, all processors contained in a chip 
share the same memories and I/Os due to stern constraints on the number of chip pins. 
The sharing results in allowing a processor to access the memories and I/Os that 
software executed on another processor uses. In order to solve the issue of this 
competitive access, our hardware structure equips with a new unit, called a bus 
management unit, on a processor bus. This unit allows each processor to access only 
specified address ranges of memories and I/Os, monitoring bus access at hardware level. 
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In this way, our bus management unit helps achieve secure processor partitioning for 
both AMP and SMP. Chapter 4 illustrates the detailed design of the hardware unit. 
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FIGURE 2.2: HARDWARE STRUCTURE 
 
2.3 SOFTWARE STRUCTURE 
Our software structure supports two types of both AMP and SMP, utilizing the 
above hardware structure. This software structure may employ heterogeneous OSs as 
well as homogeneous OSs to support multiple domains.  
FIGURE 2.3 describes an example of a software structure on AMP. By definition, a 
processor executes an OS designed for a single-core processor.  
In order to cope with the issue on scalable extension of base applications, we 
introduce user-level software, referred as to seamless communication software, to the 
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base domain. The communication software enables legacy base applications designed 
for a single-core processor to be executed on multiple processors without any software 
modification, by hooking OS system calls and handling them at the user level. This is 
especially important because, from the viewpoint of base application developers, 
separate OSs will appear to be a single, uniform OS. Chapter 3 illustrates the detailed 
design of seamless communication software. 
An individual OS forms an open domain on AMP. In this figure, while open 
domain A and B may execute applications validated by separate software manufacturers, 
open domain C may execute untrusted applications.  
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FIGURE 2.3: SOFTWARE STRUCTURE ON AMP 
 
Asymmetric virtualization helps support multiple domains for the secure execution 
of many groups of open applications without any increase of processors in this structure. 
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The virtualization allocates processors to individual domains, utilizing our bus 
management unit. In response to user requests, the virtualization invokes transitions 
between a state with only the base domain and a state with both the base domain and 
two open domains (i.e., transition (1) in FIGURE 2.3). Moreover, the virtualization 
invokes transitions between states with different states (i.e., transition (2) in FIGURE 
2.3). Chapter 5 illustrates the detailed design of asymmetric virtualization. 
The support of many domains (e.g., seven OSs in FIGURE 2.3), however, results in 
increasing the total memory requirements. In general, embedded systems employ the 
XIP (eXecute-In-Place) technique [Bird 04], which places read-only data (e.g., 
instructions) on ROM and copies only other data to RAM in order to reduce the total 
memory requirements. We apply the XIP technique to multiple homogenous OSs. 
FIGURE 2.4 shows OS memory images of both ROM and RAM in this structure. While 
both a boot loader and the kernel text (i.e., OS instructions) are shared among OSs, only 
kernel data are copied into individual areas of RAM.  
FIGURE 2.5 describes an example of a software structure on SMP. Unlike the 
software structure on AMP, seamless communication software is not employed for the 
base domain since the OS used for a base domain itself manages multiple processors.  
Secure dynamic partitioning helps support multiple domains for the secure 
execution of many groups of open applications in this structure, coordinating with our 
bus management unit and asymmetric virtualization. The dynamic partitioning allows 
processors to be de-allocated from the base domain and allows the processors to be 
allocated to open domains, and vice versa. The base domain maintains at least one 
processor.  
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FIGURE 2.4: KERNEL XIP FOR OSS 
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FIGURE 2.5: SOFTWARE STRUCTURE ON SMP 
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In the same way as the transitions of the software structure on AMP, the dynamic 
partitioning invokes transitions between a state with only the base domain and a state 
with both the base domain and two open domains (i.e., transition (1) in FIGURE 2.5). 
Moreover, the virtualization invokes transitions between states with different states (i.e., 
transition (2) in FIGURE 2.5). Chapter 6 illustrates the detailed design of secure 
dynamics partitioning. 
It should be noted that our software structure needs software modifications for the 
secure execution of open applications in spite of no software modifications for the 
scalable extension of base applications. The software modifications are, however, not a 
practical problem since the modifications create new additional values, costing for 
newly added applications (i.e., not for legacy applications). 
 
2.4 SUMMARY 
Both hardware and software structures feature our platform. The most important 
feature of the hardware structure is our bus management unit, which supports the secure 
execution of open applications at the hardware level. Moreover, three important 
techniques feature the software structure: seamless communication software, 
asymmetric virtualization, and secure dynamic partitioning. While seamless 
communication software addresses the issue of AMP in terms of the scalable extension 
of base applications, secure dynamic partitioning asymmetric addresses the issue of 
SMP in terms of the secure execution of new groups of open applications. Finally, our 
asymmetric virtualization helps support many domains on both AMP and SMP for the 
secure execution of many groups of open applications. 
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3. 
CHAPTER 3                         
SEAMLESS COMMUNICATION 
 
This chapter describes seamless communication software, which enables legacy base 
applications designed for a single-core processor to be executed on AMP without any 
software modifications. 
 
3.1 MOTIVATION 
Current high-end embedded systems, such as mobile terminals, contain millions of 
lines of source codes for OSs, application platforms (i.e., MOAP [Tsuji 05] by NTT 
DoCoMo), and base applications. A wide range of software modifications would seem 
to be required for AMP since the whole software has been designed for single-core 
processors. This software incompatibility prevents the scalable extension of base 
applications on AMP. 
Conventional distributed OS and distributed middleware approaches help resolve 
the above software compatibility issue. Distributed OS approaches (partially) support 
the application compatibility, modifying single-core OSs in order to equip with system 
calls extended to multi-core processors. By way of contrast, distributed middleware 
approaches achieve the OS compatibility, modifying applications in order to use 
middleware APIs designed for multi-core processors. In other words, neither distributed 
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OS nor distributed middleware approaches are satisfactory since both approaches 
require software modifications.  
The limitation of conventional approaches, however, indicates that one promising 
solution would seem to be the application of an approach intermediate between 
distributed OS and distributed middleware approaches, that is, distributed middleware 
that equips with system calls extended to multi-core processors. As the equipped system 
calls, this dissertation focuses on system calls associated with two Inter-Process 
Communications (IPCs): System V IPC and UNIX Domain Sockets (UDSs) [Stevens 
98]. This is because the two IPCs were most frequently used in actual Linux-based 
mobile terminal software.  
Thus, we introduce seamless communication software (i.e., middleware), achieving 
inter-core communication through the same APIs as intra-core communication, hooking 
OS system calls and executing them at the user level. In this way, legacy base 
applications designed for a single-core processor make it possible to be executed on 
AMP without any software modifications. TABLE 3.1 summarizes the qualitative 
advantages of our approach, compared with others. 
 
TABLE 3.1: ADVANTAGES OF SEAMLESS COMMUNICATION SOFTWARE 
Feature 
Distributed OS
approaches 
Distributed 
middleware
approaches 
Our approach 
OS compatibility No Yes Yes 
Application compatibility Partially, yes No Yes 
 
3.2 RELATED WORK 
Our research differs in a number of respects from the current body of research on 
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communication software. 
The major distributed OS approaches include Mach [Accetta 86], Amoeba 
[Mullender 90], Corus [Rozier 88] and TIPC [Maloy 04]. These approaches provide 
new OS system calls that are used for both intra-core and inter-core communication. 
This means that the approaches make it necessary to modify base applications as well as 
single-core OSs. In particular, distributed OS approaches for System V IPC include 
Distributed System V IPC in Locus [Fleisch 86] and DIPC [Sharif 99], which provide 
full compatibility with System V IPC. They, however, require a wide range of OS 
modifications. Moreover, UDSs are originally designed for intra-core communication at 
the OS level. This means that base applications need to be modified to use network 
sockets, such as TCP/IP and UDP/IP, for inter-core communication, instead of UDSs. 
The major distributed middleware approaches include CORBA [OMG 04], Globe 
[Steen 99], MPI [MPI 97] and DSOC [Paulin 06]. While these approaches support 
inter-core communication at the user level, they require extensive modification of base 
applications because APIs for the inter-core communication are different from OS 
system calls used for intra-core communication. In particular, distributed middleware 
approaches for System V IPC include SHOC IPC [Tan 02], which provides the same 
API as System V IPC at the user level. It, however, fails to support System V IPC 
message queues. Moreover, no distributed middleware approaches in terms of UDSs are 
unknown. 
By way of contrast, our approach requires no modification of legacy base 
applications in terms of System V IPCs and UDSs because the approach hooks OS 
system calls at the user level.  
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3.3 SYSTEM V μ-IPC 
System V μ-IPC extends the function of System V IPC to both intra-core and 
inter-core communication. It provides the same IPC objects: semaphores, messages 
queues and shared memories, supporting the same APIs as System V IPC. Here, “μ” 
(i.e., mu) stands for the respective initials: “multi-core” and “user-level.” 
 
3.3.1 OVERVIEW 
FIGURE 3.1 illustrates two important components of System V μ-IPC: a System V 
μ-IPC library and a System V μ-IPC process.  
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FIGURE 3.1: SYSTEM μ-IPC COMPONENTS 
 
A System V μ-IPC library is linked to the base applications which need inter-core 
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communication. The user-level library hooks system calls with respect to System V IPC, 
executing the system calls within it. Here, the library manages IPC objects in a shared 
RAM. For example, shared memories of System V IPC are directly mapped into part of 
the shared RAM. Control blocks required for both semaphores and message queues of 
System V IPC are stored in another part of the shared RAM. A System V μ-IPC process 
is a process which helps wake up sleeping processes at the user-level instead of an OS. 
For example, System V μ-IPC process α wakes up sleeping process A, which waits for a 
semaphore or a message queue. 
FIGURE 3.2 describes how two components of System V μ-IPC work on a 
multi-core processor.  
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FIGURE 3.2: SYSTEM μ-IPC SEMAPHORE OBJECTS 
 
Two typical cases are shown with semaphore objects: 1) when process D issues a 
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semop system call to do an up operation to a semaphore, a System V μ-IPC library 
hooks the system call. Then, the library directly wakes up process C executed on the 
same processor since the library notices that process C has been waiting for the 
semaphore; and 2) when process B issues a semop system call to do an up operation to a 
semaphore, the System V μ-IPC library hooks the system call in a similar way. Next, the 
library requests System V μ-IPC process α to wake up process A executed on a different 
processor since the library notices that process A has been waiting for the semaphore. 
Finally, System V μ-IPC process α receives the wake-up request, waking up process A. 
 
3.3.2 DESIGN 
FIGURE 3.3 shows the internal design of our System V μ-IPC library. A System V 
μ-IPC library consists of four components: an API adaptor, a mutual exclusion 
component, a memory allocator, and a process controller. An API adaptor provides 
System V APIs for semaphore, message queue, and shared memory objects. A mutual 
exclusion component offers the function of a swap-based mutual exclusion mechanism 
to the API adaptor so that the API adaptor can correctly access shared data. A memory 
allocator implements a buddy memory allocation technique [Knuth 97], which provides 
any size of memory from a shared RAM to the API adaptor. A process controller sends a 
System V μ-IPC process a control message through Inter-Processor Interrupt (IPI) so 
that the System V μ-IPC can wake up a sleeping process. Here, a control message 
contains the process ID of a sleeping process. 
 
CHAPTER 3: SEAMLESS COMMUNICATION 
 
27
Mutual Exclusion
Component
Memory
Allocator
Process 
Controller
API Adaptor
System V IPC API
Shared RAM Inter-ProcessorInterrupt
System V μ-IPC Library
External
Devices
 
FIGURE 3.3: INTERNAL DESIGN OF SYSTEM μ-IPC LIBRARY  
 
FIGURE 3.4 and FIGURE 3.5 show detailed operation flows of a System V μ-IPC 
Process. In these figures, process 3 wakes up two sleeping processes executed on a 
different processor, process 1 and 2, through two semaphore objects. 
A System V μ-IPC process sleeps through an ioctl system call, waiting for an 
interrupt. Then, process 3 issues a semop system call to do an up operation to a 
semaphore. The System V μ-IPC library linked to process 3 hooks the system call. After 
that, the library puts a control message into a shared RAM with an IPI in order to wake 
up process 1. Further, process 3 issues a semop system call to do an up operation to 
another semaphore. In a similar way, the System V μ-IPC library puts another control 
message into the shared RAM in order to wake up process 2. The second control 
message is simply linked to the previous control message without any IPIs. This means 
that multiple IPIs are not simultaneously sent to the System V μ-IPC process in order to 
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avoid overlapping interrupts. Once an IPI driver receives an IPI, it wakes up the System 
V μ-IPC process through a signal. In this way, the System V μ-IPC library wakes up a 
sleeping System V μ-IPC process. 
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FIGURE 3.4: OPERATION FLOW OF SYSTEM μ-IPC PROCESS (PART I) 
 
Second, the awakened System V μ-IPC process retrieves two control messages 
from a linked list in the shared RAM, waking up two sleeping processes, process 1 and 
process 2. When the System V μ-IPC process has finished retrieving any control 
messages, it re-issues an ioctl system call in order to wait for an interrupt. In this way, 
process 3 wakes up two sleeping processes, process 1 and process 2, through a System 
V μ-IPC process. 
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FIGURE 3.5: OPERATION FLOW OF SYSTEM μ-IPC PROCESS (PART II) 
 
3.4 μ-UDS 
μ-UDS extends the function of UDSs to both intra-core and inter-core 
communication. This user-level software supports the same APIs as UDSs. Here, “μ” 
(i.e., mu) stands for the respective initials: “multi-core” and “user-level.” 
 
3.4.1 OVERVIEW 
FIGURE 3.6 illustrates two important components of μ-UDS: a μ-UDS library and 
a μ-UDS process. A μ-UDS library is linked to the base applications which need 
inter-core communication (i.e., server applications). The user-level library hooks two 
system calls, bind and close, notifying μ-UDS processes executed on different 
processors of the hooked system calls. A μ-UDS process is a process which helps 
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handle system calls notified from a μ-UDS library at the user level. For example, a 
μ-UDS process binds a new socket in response to bind notifications and closes a socket 
in response to close notifications. In addition, μ-UDS processes support data transfer 
between different processors. 
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FIGURE 3.6: μ-UDS COMPONENTS 
 
FIGURE 3.7 shows how two μ-UDS components work for a bind system call. 
When process A issues a bind system call to a UDS, a μ-UDS library hooks the system 
call. Next, the library notifies μ-UDS processes on different processors of the system 
call. μ-UDS process β issues a bind system call in order to receive data from client 
processes (e.g., process C). Finally, the library executes a bind system call in order to 
bind a socket to process A. 
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FIGURE 3.7: BIND SYSTEM CALL OF μ-UDS 
 
FIGURE 3.8 shows how two μ-UDS components work for data transfer among 
processes. Here, two typical cases are shown: 1) when process B sends data to a UDS of 
an OS, process A receives the data from the OS; and 2) when process C sends data to an 
OS, μ-UDS process β receives the data from the OS. Next, μ-UDS process β transfers 
the data to μ-UDS process α. Finally, μ-UDS process α sends the data to process A. 
FIGURE 3.9 shows how two μ-UDS components work for a close system call. 
When process A issues a close system call to a UDS, a μ-UDS library hooks the system 
call. Next, the library notifies μ-UDS processes on different processors of the system 
call. μ-UDS process β issues a close system call. Finally, the library executes a close 
system call in order to close a socket bound to process A. 
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FIGURE 3.8: DATA TRANSFER OF μ-UDS 
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FIGURE 3.9: CLOSE SYSTEM CALL OF μ-UDS 
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3.4.2 DESIGN  
FIGURE 3.10 depicts the internal design of our μ-UDS library. A μ-UDS library 
consists of four components: an API adaptor, a database manager, a μ-UDS 
communicator, and a system call handler. An API adaptor provides two same APIs as 
bind and close system calls. A database manager manages a database based on both a 
shared memory object and a semaphore object of System V μ-IPC. Each entry in the 
database contains the ID of a server process using a UDS, the name bound to the UDS, 
and the socket file descriptor corresponding to the UDS. A μ-UDS communicator sends 
μ-UDS processes the arguments given from bind and close system calls via message 
queue objects of System V μ-IPC. A system call handler executes system calls requested 
from an API handler. 
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FIGURE 3.10: INTERNAL DESIGN OF μ-UDS 
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FIGURE 3.11, FIGURE 3.12, and FIGURE 3.13 show the detailed operation flows of 
a μ-UDS process. A μ-UDS process consists of two components: a main controller, and 
communication threads. Here, the operation flows are corresponding to the examples 
shown in FIGURE 3.7, FIGURE 3.8, and FIGURE 3.9, respectively.  
FIGURE 3.11 illustrates how a μ-UDS process internally handles a bind system call 
(see FIGURE 3.7). First, μ-UDS process β receives the notification of a bind system call 
from a μ-UDS library. The main controller of μ-UDS process β creates a new 
communication thread. After that, the thread issues a bind system call in order to receive 
data from process C.  
 
Communication
Thread
o unication
Thread
Communication
Thread
Main Controller
μ-UDS Process β
1. N
otification of
a bind system
 call
2. Create a thread
3. Issue a bind 
system call 
to an OS
Domain 1
 
FIGURE 3.11: OPERATION FLOW OF μ-UDS (BIND SYSTEM CALL) 
 
FIGURE 3.12 describes how μ-UDS processes internally transfer data between 
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processors (see FIGURE 3.8). A communication thread created by μ-UDS process 
β receives data from process C, transferring the data to the main controller of μ-UDS 
process α. Then, the main controller of μ-UDS process α sends the data to process A. 
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FIGURE 3.12: OPERATION FLOW OF μ-UDS (DATA TRANSFER) 
 
FIGURE 3.13 depicts how a μ-UDS process internally handles a close system call 
(see FIGURE 3.9). First, μ-UDS process β receives the notification of a close system call 
from a μ-UDS library. After that, the main controller of μ-UDS process β destroys a 
communication thread corresponding to a socket bound to process A. Finally, the main 
controller issues a close system call in order to close the socket. 
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FIGURE 3.13: OPERATION FLOW OF μ-UDS (CLOSE SYSTEM CALL) 
 
3.5 EVALUATION 
TABLE 3.2 summarizes our AMP evaluation environment, called MP211 [Torii 05]. 
MP211 is a mobile application processor which equips with three ARM processors. 
Interestingly, the area of three processors occupies only 15% of this whole SoC, as 
shown in FIGURE 3.14. 
 
TABLE 3.2: AMP EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT 
Item Feature 
Processors ARM926EJ-S x 3 
Cache I: 16KB, D: 16KB 
Frequency ARM: 200MHz, Bus: 100MHz 
OS Linux 
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FIGURE 3.14: MP211 AS AMP EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT  
 
Evaluations show that our seamless communication software actually worked on 
AMP (see Section 3.5.1). Further, both System V μ-IPC and μ-UDS achieved higher 
performance (see Section 3.5.2, and 3.5.3) and lower code size (see Section 3.5.4) than 
did other approaches. 
 
3.5.1 SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE FOR SEAMLESS IPCS 
As a successful example of the application of our seamless communication 
software, FIGURE 3.15 demonstrates that the menu screen of an in-house Linux-based 
mobile terminal on MP211.  
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FIGURE 3.15: LINUX-BASED MOBILE TERMINAL ON AMP 
 
This means that the seamless communication software enabled actual in-house 
Linux-based mobile terminal software designed for a single processor to be run on three 
processors without software modifications. This result is especially remarkable because 
it cannot be achieved with other approaches. Further, the performance overhead of the 
seamless communication software was small enough because its performance overhead 
was only 0.1% for the original in-house mobile terminal software. 
 
3.5.2 SYSTEM V μ-IPC PERFORMANCE 
In order to study the performance effectiveness of our System V μ-IPC, we 
measured the execution time of System V IPC systems calls. We compared our System 
V μ-IPC with a distributed System V IPC of SHell Over a Cluster (SHOC) [Tan 02] as 
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an available reference. This comparison must be interpreted very carefully because 
SHOC is implemented on PC clusters.  
FIGURE 3.16 shows the normalized execution time of three system calls: a semop 
system call to a remote semaphore object, a shmat system call to a shared memory 
object, and a shmdt system call to a shared memory object. Here, the execution time of a 
semop system call to a local semaphore object is normalized to 1. Values in parenthesis 
indicate the measured execution time with respect to each system call for the reference. 
This evaluation demonstrates that our System V μ-IPC achieved roughly 5.0 times 
faster normalized execution time (13.8 times faster measured execution time) than did 
SHOC. Thus, our System V μ-IPC is efficiently designed for AMP with shared memory.  
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FIGURE 3.16: SYSTEM V μ-IPC PERFORMANCE  
 
It should be noted that, in our System V μ-IPC, the absolute execution time of the 
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compared system calls is not necessarily slow although we used the normalized 
execution time for the comparison of different platforms. With respect to the execution 
time of a semop system call to a local semaphore object (i.e., the base-reference 
execution time on a single processor), our System V μ-IPC achieves the execution time 
of 21 μs on a 200-MHz processor while SHOC achieves the execution time of 59 μs on 
a 450-MHz processor.  
 
3.5.3 μ-UDS PERFORMANCE 
In order to study the performance effective of our μ-UDS, we measured the 
bandwidth of both our μ-UDS and Linux network sockets. FIGURE 3.17 shows the 
bandwidths of connection-less communication on two processors in the transfer of 1 
MB of data in fragment sizes of 1KB, 4 KB and 16 KB.  
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FIGURE 3.17: μ-UDS PERFORMANCE 
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In fragment sizes of 4KB and 16KB, our μ-UDS achieved roughly 1.5 times higher 
bandwidth than did kernel-based UDP/IP. This is because, instead of a complex protocol 
designed for the Internet, our μ-UDS internally uses a message queue object of System 
V IPC in order to transfer the data between two processors. 
 
3.5.4 LINES OF CODE FOR SEAMLESS COMMUNICATION 
In order to study the design effectiveness of both System V μ-IPC and μ-UDS, we 
counted their modified Lines of Code (LOC). First, we compared System V μ-IPC with 
two available references: a distributed OS, known as Distributed System V IPC in 
Locus [Fleisch 86], and a distributed middleware, known as DIPC [Sharif 99]. The 
modified LOC of System V μ-IPC was 3,853 LOC. Thus, System V μ-IPC is effectively 
implemented in the smallest size because the modified LOC of Locus was 5,559 LOC 
and the modified LOC of DIPC was 6,265 LOC. Next, we compared our μ-UDS with 
Internet domain sockets of Linux as a reference. It can be seen from the comparison that 
μ-UDS with 1,488 LOC is 13.7 times smaller than Internet domain sockets of Linux 
with 20,365 LOC. 
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
We have presented our seamless communication software, which enables legacy 
base applications designed for a single-core processor to be executed on AMP without 
any modifications of base applications and OSs. Its most important feature is the 
hooking and execution of OS system calls at the user level. In this way, the software 
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maintains the API compatibility of IPC system calls on multiple processors. We have 
reported the detailed design of both System V μ-IPC and μ-UDSs as two most 
important IPCs. Moreover, our evaluations with respect to System V μ-IPC and μ-UDS 
have shown its effectiveness, demonstrating three fundamental features: a successful 
example with actual mobile terminal software, high performance and small code size. 
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4. 
CHAPTER 4                         
SECURE PROCESSOR PARTITIONING 
 
This chapter presents a new hardware unit designed for secure processor partitioning, 
called a bus management unit. The unit enables OSs executed on separate processors to 
be mutually protected at the hardware level.  
 
4.1 MOTIVATION 
Current high-end embedded systems, such as mobile terminals, have already 
equipped with an execution environment designed for a closed class of open 
applications. For example, the approach of NTT DoCoMo enables applications written 
in Java to be executed on a Java VM [Gong 03]. The approach of KDDI enables 
pre-verified applications to be executed on a dedicated platform, called BREW 
[Qualcomm 04]. A similarity between both approaches is use of dedicated software 
platforms in order to form an execution environment. 
The open applications that we target include general user-level programs and 
device drivers. This means that such new groups of open applications need to be 
directly executed on native OSs instead of traditional non-native software platforms. 
Sharing a native OS between base and open applications shows potential vulnerability 
since bugs and viruses include in open applications are likely to cause critical 
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interference to base applications, such as unintentional access to prohibited areas, and 
loss of needed excess resource allocation. NTT DoCoMo, IBM, and Intel have, in fact, 
jointly announced specifications designed to encourage the development of mobile 
terminals having a security capability [NTT 04a] [NTT 04b]. 
Conventional secure techniques, which are implemented as software, help cover 
critical potential vulnerability. The secure techniques, however, cause additional 
potential vulnerability to systems in a vicious cycle since the software that implements 
the techniques itself might have new potential vulnerability. This means that one 
promising approach would seem to be the use of hardware.  
Thus, we introduce secure processor partitioning, which enables native OSs 
executed on separate processors to be mutually protected by means of a new hardware 
unit, called a bus management unit. This unit prohibits a native OS compromised by 
malicious open applications from accessing other memory and I/O areas managed by 
other native OSs since processors are allowed to access only specified address ranges of 
memories and I/Os.  
 
4.2 RELATED WORK 
Our research differs in a number of respects from the current body of research on 
program security. 
Major tool-level approaches include RATS [Fortify 09] and Splint [Evans 02]. 
While the approaches help find potential vulnerability by inspecting the source codes of 
open applications, the source codes of open applications are required before their 
execution.  
Major library-level approaches include StackGuard [Cowan 98] and Libsafe 
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[Baratloo 00]. The libraries help detect malicious attacks, such as buffer overflow 
attacks, at run-time. Unlike tool-level approaches, these approaches require no source 
codes of open applications. There is, however, no guarantee that library-level 
approaches make it possible to detect all malicious attacks. 
Major kernel-level domain approaches, such as SELinux [Loscocco 01] and 
Openwall [Openwall 01], allow both base and open applications to be run on a shared 
OS since a security module within the shared OS monitors system calls issued from all 
applications and imposes mandatory access control on all applications. It is, however, 
difficult to avoid security vulnerability in OSs and security modules. 
Major virtualized domain approaches include LPAR [Armstrong 05], Xen [Barham 
03], UML [Dike 00] and VMware [Sugerman 01]. Virtualized domains (i.e., virtualized 
native OSs) enhance system security since they allow base applications to be separated 
from open applications at the OS level. There is, however, a degree of security 
vulnerability in complex virtualization software [Hacker 07]. In accordance with the 
problem, recent work [Chen 08] [Seshadri 07] [Shinagawa 09] has proposed tiny 
virtualization software in order to reduce security vulnerability of virtualization 
software itself. 
It should be noted that similar hardware approaches, such as SECA [Coburn 05] 
and distributed filters on Network-on-Chips (NoCs) [Fiolin 07], were proposed around 
the same time as our bus management unit in order to block illegal accesses at the 
hardware level. While our bus management unit helps enhance system-level program 
security, the similar approaches focus on only communication-level security. 
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4.3 BUS MANAGEMENT UNIT 
FIGURE 4.1 outlines an example of AMP used for mobile terminals. In this figure, 
the AMP software structure equips with four domains: a base domain, an operator 
domain, a trusted domain, and an untrusted domain. Each domain has a native OS on a 
separate processor.  
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FIGURE 4.1: AMP FOR MOBILE TERMINALS 
 
A base domain contains the base applications of a mobile terminal, such as a mailer 
and a browser. Open applications are never executed on a base domain. While an 
operator domain executes applications validated by an operator, a trusted domain 
executes applications validated by third parties. The open applications executed in both 
an operator domain and a trusted domain are assumed to be sufficiently trustworthy 
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although they may include bugs. Finally, an untrusted domain executes all other open 
applications. The open applications might include viruses as well as bugs. In this way, 
users enable open applications to be installed to their corresponding classes of domains.  
The requirements of our bus management unit are the achievement of two major 
functions under an important specification. Here, the two major functions of our bus 
management unit are 1) checking all accesses issued from processors that belong to 
open domains, and 2) deciding whether or not the accesses are illegal. In addition, the 
important specification is that only processors that belong to a base domain are allowed 
to change the control of the unit. This means that it is impossible for even incredibly 
malicious open applications to escape access checking since processors compromised 
by the open applications have no rights to change the control of our bus management 
unit. In this way, our platform ensures hardware-level hardened protection among 
domains. It should be noted that secure processor partitioning allows our bus 
management unit to be variously designed and implemented as far as the unit equips 
with the two major functions under the important specification.  
FIGURE 4.2 describes an example of the design of our bus management unit. The 
unit contains two components: an access matrix and an access check component. 
An access matrix stores the information on the accessibility of all possible 
combinations between processors and bus slaves (e.g., memory or I/O). Then, only 
processors that belong to a base domain (i.e., CPU0) are allowed to modify this access 
matrix. 
An access check component checks the access information, such as processor ID, 
access type, and access address, of bus access issued from a processor to a bus slave. 
Then, the component determines whether the bus access should be granted, referring to 
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an access matrix. In this figure, we assume that a base domain uses Slave A and Address 
Range 0, and both an operator domain and a trusted domain use Slave B and Address 
Range 1. While processors (i.e., CPU1 and CPU2) executing in both an operator domain 
and a trusted domain are only allowed any access to resources used for both domains 
(i.e., Slave B and Address Range 1), they are prohibited write access to resources used 
for a base domain (i.e., Slave A and Address Range 0). Moreover, while processors (i.e., 
CPU3) executing in an untrusted domain are only allowed read-only access to resources 
used for the operator domain and the trusted domain (i.e., Slave B and Address Range 
1), they are prohibited any access to resources used for the base domain (i.e., Slave A 
and Address Range 0).  
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FIGURE 4.2: BUS MANAGEMENT UNIT 
 
FIGURE 4.3 depicts an example of the internal design of a system bus with our bus 
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management unit. Here, we assume that this system bus uses the AXI bus protocol 
[ARM 04].  
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FIGURE 4.3: INTERNAL DESIGN OF SYSTEM BUS 
 
As shown in this figure, only read address channels and write address channels are 
connected to an access check component while other channels (i.e., write data channels, 
read data channels and write reply channels) are directly connected between processors 
and bus slaves. This is because an access check component needs two important access 
information: 32-bit address information (i.e., ARADDR[31:0] and AWADDR[31:0]), 
and 4-bit ID information containing both processor ID and access type (i.e., ARID[3:0] 
and AWID[3:0]). An access matrix contains 24 address range entries, allocating eight 
address range entries to each of three processors. If an access address is included in one 
of the address ranges, an access check component simply changes the access address to 
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an invalid access address in order to cause a bus error on a system bus. Otherwise, the 
bus access directly passes the access component. 
 
4.4 EVALUATION 
Evaluations show that our bus management unit can be efficiently implemented 
(see Section 4.4.1), and the unit helps enhance system-level security (see Section 4.4.2). 
 
4.4.1 HARDWARE SPECIFICATIONS 
TABLE 4.1 summarizes hardware specifications of our bus management unit.  
 
TABLE 4.1: HARDWARE SPECIFICATIONS OF BUS MANAGEMENT UNIT 
Item Feature 
Bus protocol AXI 
The number of input / output channels 2 / 2 
The number of address ranges 24 
Technology node 130nm 
Gate size 53.4K gate 
Delay between input and output channels 1.28 ns 
 
FIGURE 4.4 shows its schematic block diagram. This unit is designed for ARM 
MPCore [ARM 06] with four processors. We synthesized this unit by Synopsys Design 
Compiler, minimizing the delay between input and output channels. These results 
indicate that the area and latency overhead of this unit is small enough to be 
incorporated into a system bus. In addition, FIGURE 4.5 describes the breakdown of the 
gate size of our bus management unit. An access matrix occupies 30% of the gate size 
since the access matrix is implemented as flip-flop arrays. Instead of flip-flops, use of 
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an SRAM array would be a promising option in order to reduce the total gate size. 
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FIGURE 4.4: SCHEMATIC BLOCK DIAGRAM OF BUS MANAGEMENT UNIT 
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FIGURE 4.5: BREAKDOWN OF GATE SIZE OF BUS MANAGEMENT UNIT 
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4.4.2 SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE FOR SECURE PARTITIONING 
As a successful example of the application of our bus management unit, FIGURE 
4.6 demonstrates the device coordination between a mobile terminal and an external 
projector.  
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FIGURE 4.6: DOWNLOADING PROJECTOR DEVICE DRIVER 
 
Here, a user displays a downloaded PDF file of his/her presentation through an 
external projector connected to a mobile terminal (see FIGURE 4.6 (a)). For the 
projector control, a projector device driver and a User Interface (UI) application are 
downloaded. A download client executed on a base domain manages the downloading 
of the projector device driver and the UI application. Then, a download manager 
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executed on an untrusted domain installs the projector device driver into the OS of the 
untrusted domain, executing the UI application on the OS. The UI application and the 
projector device driver, however, might have critical bugs or viruses. For example, 
memory leakage bugs of the projector device driver result in crashing the OS of the 
trusted domain (see FIGURE 4.6 (b)). Our bus management unit maintains the protection 
of the base domain even during the OS crash, preventing illegal access issued by the 
crashed OS. In order to recover the untrusted domain, the base domain simply reboots a 
processor executing the crashed OS. 
TABLE 4.2 summarizes the security level of secure platforms, reviewing the 
relationship between the execution of open applications and the protection of base 
domains. The underlined items indicate highly desirable characteristics. Our approach 
achieved the highest security level than did conventional approaches.  
 
TABLE 4.2: SECURITY LEVEL COMPARISON 
Software Kernel-level domain 
Virtualized 
domain 
Our 
approach 
Bugs No crash No crash No crash 
Application 
Viruses Crash No crash No crash 
Bugs Crash No crash No crash 
Device driver 
Viruses Crash Crash No crash 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
We have presented secure processor partitioning supported by our bus management 
unit. The unit enables OSs executed on separate processors to be mutually protected at 
the hardware level. Its most important feature is the prevention of illegal access on a 
system bus. We have designed our bus management unit, referring to the AXI bus 
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protocol. Evaluations have shown its effectiveness, demonstrating two fundamental 
features: excellent hardware specifications and a high security level. 
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5. 
CHAPTER 5                       
ASYMMETRIC VIRTUALIZATION 
 
This chapter presents fast, secure virtualization, called asymmetric virtualization, by 
which many OSs over the number of processors are securely executed under secure 
processor partitioning.  
 
5.1 MOTIVATION 
Mobile Information Device Platform (MIDP) specifications [Sun 06] request 
General System for Mobile communications (GSM) / Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) compliant devices to provide at least five 
protection domains in order to install downloaded applications: a base domain, an 
identified third party domain, an unidentified third party domain, an operator domain, 
and a manufacturer domain. The number of protection domains would seem to increase 
for the secure execution of various groups of open applications.  
In order to cope with this issue, virtualization would seem to be one promising 
solution. Without virtualization, AMP needs to increase the number of processors in 
proportion to the number of required domains. Conventional virtualization technologies, 
however, have a degree of security vulnerability [Hacker 07]. In addition, the 
technologies unfit for embedded systems in terms of base features, such as performance 
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overhead and memory footprint, since traditional virtualization technologies have been 
originally developed for computing systems.  
We introduce a fast, secure virtualization technology, known as asymmetric 
virtualization, which utilizes secure processor partitioning (see Chapter 4). The most 
important feature of asymmetric virtualization is the achievement of both high 
performance and highly hardened security. In this way, open embedded systems enable 
any number of domains for the secure execution of many groups of open applications. It 
should be noted that Chapter 6 discusses the application of this asymmetric 
virtualization to SMP. 
 
5.2 RELATED WORK 
Our research differs in a number of respects from the current body of research on 
virtualization technologies. Virtualizing a processor needs to effectively trap sensitive 
instructions, which are defined as the instructions which would affect the allocation of 
system resources [Popek 74]. 
The major kernel-level Virtualization Machine Monitors (VMMs), known as type-I 
VMMs, include Xen [Barham 03], which employs para-virtualization [Whitaker 02] 
(i.e., OS modifications). The approaches use a separate, additional processor mode (e.g., 
a hypervisor mode) [Armstrong 05] [Neiger 06] in order to emulate sensitive 
instructions. They cause little performance degradation in many applications since the 
additional processor mode enables normal instructions to be directly executed. There 
remains, however, severe performance degradation in both the applications which use 
OS system calls and device drivers since sensitive instructions still need to be virtually 
emulated. 
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The major user-level VMMs, known as type-II VMMs, include User Mode Linux 
(UML) [Dike 00] (a port of Linux to run as a Linux process), and VMware [Sugerman 
01]. The approaches emulate sensitive instructions by software-only mechanisms. While 
they need no additional processor mode, their software-only emulations result in severe 
performance degradation in many applications. 
Further, the security level of both type-I and type-II VMMs depends on the 
implementation of VMM software since viruses make it possible to exploit security 
holes in the VMMs [Hacker 07]. FIGURE 5.1 describes the software structures of both 
type-I and type-II VMMs. Both VMMs have been widely accepted for use in computing 
systems with PCs and servers. This is because their high generality makes it possible to 
utilize conventional hardware. 
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FIGURE 5.1: RELATED WORK: TYPE-I AND TYPE-II VMM 
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5.3 DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
FIGURE 5.2 outlines an example of asymmetric virtualization on AMP used for 
mobile terminals. In this figure, the AMP software structure equips with five domains 
on three processors in accordance with MIDP specifications [Sun 06]: a base domain, an 
operator domain, a manufacturer domain, a trusted domain, and an untrusted domain. 
While a base domain executes base applications on a dedicated processor (i.e., CPU0), 
the other domains execute open applications on any processor of the two remaining 
processors. 
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FIGURE 5.2: VIRTUALIZED AMP FOR MOBILE TERMINALS 
 
Traditional VMMs deploy the architecture of parallel VMMs on a multi-core 
processor (i.e., symmetric virtualization) [Armstrong 05]. Such symmetric virtualization, 
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however, causes a deadlock problem which prevents non-compromised VMMs from 
accessing shared resources when a VMM compromised by open applications holds the 
shared resources [Coffman 71]. This results in separating the roles of virtualization 
software, called asymmetric virtualization. 
FIGURE 5.3 illustrates the design principles of asymmetric virtualization. A 
traditional VMM supports three basic functions in it: domain scheduling, which decides 
the next executed domain; domain setting, which saves and restores processor contexts; 
and domain separation, which blocks illegal accesses issued from a domain. In our 
design principles, the three functions are allocated to three separate components: a 
Master VMM, a Slave VMM, and our bus management unit. Here, the function of 
domain scheduling is allocated to a Master VMM included in a base domain since a 
base domain needs to control domains in response to the flexible execution of open 
applications. The function of domain separation is allocated to our bus management unit 
since speed overhead of this function degrades the performance of executed domains. 
Further, the function of domain setting is allocated to a Slave VMM included in an open 
domain since a processor allocated for open applications requires the flexible execution 
of multiple domains.  
Two most important factors of our design principles are both the allocation of a 
dedicated processor to a base domain (i.e., use of a multi-core processor) and the 
domain protection of our bus management unit. The allocation of a dedicated processor 
to a base domain guarantees the protection of processor resources, such as mode 
registers and system registers, since the processor resources are never shared with open 
domains. In addition, our bus management unit enables domain resources, such as 
memories and I/Os, to be protected among domains at the hardware level. Thus, our 
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asymmetric virtualization needs no emulation of sensitive instructions because the two 
factors avoid resource interference among virtualized domains, maintaining highly 
hardened security. 
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FIGURE 5.3: DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF ASYMMETRIC VIRTUALIZATION 
 
TABLE 5.1 compares our asymmetric virtualization with other approaches. In the 
table, the best characteristic is underlined for each item. Type-II VMMs have the 
advantage of high generality. Type-I VMMs have the advantage of higher performance 
and security than do type-II VMMs at the expense of a new processor mode. Our 
asymmetric virtualization has the advantages of highest performance and security at the 
sacrifice of generality (i.e., the fixed execution of a base domain on a dedicated 
processor). In other words, at the sacrifice of generality, the allocation of a dedicated 
processor to a base domain helps achieve the secure control of our bus management unit. 
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Then, our bus management unit provides highly hardened security with fast access 
checking at the hardware level. 
 
TABLE 5.1: COMPARISON WITH OTHER VIRTUALIZATION APPROACHES 
Item Type-I VMM Type-II VMM Our approach 
Security level Moderate Low High 
Performance Moderate Low High 
Scope of applications General General Specific 
 
It should be noted that virtualization-assist hardware, such as Intel VT [Neiger 06], 
has been proposed in order to efficiently support processor virtualization. Adams and 
Agesen [Adams 06], however, have shown that the hardware fails to provide an 
unambiguous performance advantage for two primary reasons: 1) no support for MMU 
virtualization, and 2) failure of co-existing with existing software techniques for MMU 
virtualization. By way of contrast, our bus management unit results in faster 
virtualization, eliminating MMU virtualization. 
 
5.3.1 MASTER VMM 
A Master VMM schedules domains on a base domain in response to two APIs: a 
context-setting API, which sets a domain context, and a context-switching API, which 
notifies a Master VMM of the execution of a specified domain. Here, a domain context 
is defined as a set of register values used to restore a processor. For example, a domain 
context of an ARM processor contains one register bank with eight registers, two 
register banks with five registers, six register banks with two registers, one current 
processor status register, one saved processor status register, and CP15 registers [ARM 
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05]. 
FIGURE 5.4 describes the design of a Master VMM. It consists of three 
components: 1) a domain context manager, 2) an inter-VMM communication handler, 
and 3) a domain scheduler.  
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FIGURE 5.4: DESIGN OF MASTER VMM 
 
A domain context manager governs domain contexts, which are connected to a 
double-linked list with a hash table. This domain context manager adds a new domain 
context given from a context-setting API to the double-linked list. In addition, the 
manager sends a domain context to a domain scheduler, and receives a domain context 
from a domain scheduler. 
An inter-VMM communication handler sends a domain context to a Slave VMM 
and receives a domain context from a Slave VMM via shared memory and an 
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inter-processor interrupt. The detailed design of this handler is described in FIGURE 5.7. 
A domain scheduler controls all domains in coordination with a domain manager 
and an inter-VMM communication handler. When a domain scheduler is invoked by a 
context-switching API, the domain scheduler decides to invoke a domain specified by 
the API. Then, the domain scheduler receives the context of the specified domain from a 
domain context manager, and sends the domain context to a Slave VMM via an 
inter-VMM communication handler. In addition, the domain scheduler changes an 
access matrix of our bus management unit, allowing a processor executing the specified 
domain to access its domain resources. Finally, the domain scheduler receives from the 
inter-VMM communication handler a domain context which the Slave VMM previously 
executed, giving the domain context to the domain context manager.  
 
5.3.2 SLAVE VMM 
A Slave VMM switches multiple domains on a processor in response to a request 
from a Master VMM. This Slave VMM emulates no sensitive instructions, unlike other 
VMM software.  
FIGURE 5.5 describes the design of a Slave VMM. It consists of two components: 
1) an inter-VMM communication handler, and 2) a domain switcher. An inter-VMM 
communication handler receives a domain context from a Master VMM, and sends a 
domain context to a Master VMM via shared memory and an inter-processor interrupt. 
The detailed design of this handler is described in FIGURE 5.7. A domain switcher 
controls both the domain context that was previously executed on a Slave VMM and the 
domain context that will be executed next on the Slave VMM. When a domain 
scheduler receives a new domain context from a Master VMM, it sends back an old 
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domain context executed on the domain scheduler via an inter-VMM communication 
handler. After that, the domain scheduler sets a new domain context to a processor on it. 
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FIGURE 5.5: DESIGN OF SLAVE VMM 
 
It should be noted that the execution of a Slave VMM is guaranteed. Typical RISC 
processors employ Harvard architecture [Hennessy 07], whose processors have 
separated caches for instructions and data. In order to modify any instructions of a Slave 
VMM, a processor must issue a data access to the text section of the Slave VMM. This 
means that the processor results in causing a write miss on the data cache even though 
instructions of the slave VMM have been already stored to the instruction cache. Since 
our bus management unit allows the processor only to fetch instructions through the 
instruction bus, it can block a cache-refill data access on the data bus. In this way, our 
bus management unit prevents instructions of Slave VMMs from being modified by 
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compromised OSs.  
 
5.3.3 INTER-VMM COMMUNICATION 
FIGURE 5.6 illustrates the design of inter-VMM communication between a Master 
VMM executed on processor 0 and a Slave VMM executed on processor K. Two buffers, 
called “previous”, and “next”, characterize this inter-VMM communication.  
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FIGURE 5.6: INTER-VMM COMMUNICATION 
 
First, a Master VMM puts a domain context into the “next” buffer allocated for 
processor K on shared memory. Second, the Master VMM sends a context switch 
request with an inter-processor interrupt to a Slave VMM executed on processor K. 
After that, the Slave VMM saves the old domain context executed on processor K to the 
“previous” buffer. Moreover, the Slave VMM replies an acknowledgment to the Master 
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VMM, switching to the requested domain context. Here, the Slave VMM disables any 
interrupts in order to maintain the atomicity between the acknowledgment and the 
context switch. Finally, the Master VMM gets the old domain context of processor K 
from the “previous” buffer. 
 
5.4 INTER-DOMAIN COMMUNICATION 
FIGURE 5.7 shows the design of Inter-Domain Communication (IDC), which helps 
achieve communication between an application on a running domain and an application 
on a dormant domain (i.e., a non-running domain), since the dormant domain must be 
activated on demand. Here, we assume that an application on domain 1 communicates 
with an application on domain 2. In the case that domain 2 has already run on a 
processor, a device driver included in domain 1 simply sends data to the corresponding 
device driver included in domain 2. Otherwise, a device driver included in domain 1 
sends a context switch request and data to the master device driver included in a base 
domain. A kernel thread of the master device driver invokes domain 2 through a Master 
VMM, retransferring the data to the device driver included in domain 2.  
It should be noted that these device drivers use inter-processor interrupts for IDC. 
A large number of interrupts from compromised OSs have the potential risk to cause 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to a base domain. Interrupt masking or an interrupt 
controller with a Quality-of-Service (QoS) mechanism, however, helps protect such 
DoS attacks. 
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FIGURE 5.7: INTER-DOMAIN COMMUNICATION 
 
5.5 EVALUATION 
We used the same MP211 evaluation environment as Section 3.5. In this section, a 
Master VMM and a Slave VMM are implemented as a kernel module and an interrupt 
handler, respectively. Evaluations show that our asymmetric virtualization actually 
worked on AMP (see Section 5.5.1). In addition, the virtualization achieved higher 
performance (see Section 5.5.2, and 5.5.3) and lower code size (see Section 5.5.4) than 
did other approaches.  
 
5.5.1 SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE FOR VIRTUALIZATION 
As a successful example of the application of our asymmetric virtualization, 
FIGURE 5.8 demonstrates that five Linux OSs run on three ARM processors. Processor 
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1 has two domains 1 and 3, and processor 2 also has two domains 2 and 4. In the lower 
half of the figure, 3D graphic processes show the operating states of each domain. In the 
top half of the figure, a control board process on domain 0 manages running domains by 
IDC. In this figure, domains 3 and 4 are running, and domains 1 and 2 are dormant.  
The time required for an OS switch was less than 0.5ms. This OS switch overhead 
is not a problem with Linux-based mobile terminals since the time quantum of a process 
on embedded Linux (e.g., 150ms) is much longer than the OS switch overhead. 
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FIGURE 5.8: VIRTUALIZING FIVE DOMAINS ON THREE PROCESSORS  
 
5.5.2 VIRTUALIZATION PERFORMANCE ON OPEN DOMAIN 
In order to prove that our approach achieved faster virtualization than did other 
approaches, we executed two micro-benchmarks of LMbench [Mcvoy 96] on an open 
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domain: processes and context switching micro-benchmarks. LMbench is a typical 
benchmark in order to measure single OS performance on PCs. While the processes 
micro-benchmarks are used to measure the basic process primitives, such as creating a 
new process and running a different program, the context switching micro-benchmarks 
are used to measure the time needed to save the state of one process and restore the state 
of another process. Here, we were unable to evaluate application-level benchmarks 
because of two primary reasons: 1) the small memory capacity of our evaluation board 
and 2) no standard application-level benchmarks for the measurement of virtualization 
overhead. 
FIGURE 5.9 and FIGURE 5.10 describes the evaluation results of two 
micro-benchmarks. We selected 13 items, which are especially important to measure the 
efficiency of processor virtualization itself (i.e., relatively less independent from I/Os 
and file systems), from 24 items shown in [Barham 03]. Further, in reference to 
[Barham 03], the results of other VMMs, Xen (a type-I VMM) and UML (a type-II 
VMM), are also shown in the figures. Here, respectively in two different evaluation 
environments, each performance of the micro-benchmarks executed on non-virtualized 
Linux is normalized to 1 for the sake of relative comparison. 
In process micro-benchmarks measuring system call performance, the average 
virtualization overhead of our approach was only 3.2%. For reference, our approach 
achieved 1.2 times higher average performance than did Xen and 58 times higher one 
than did UML. In particular, our approach improved “fork” and “exec” performance 
because an OS on a Slave VMM is able to update large numbers of a page table without 
any emulation. While Xen software needs to check whether the page table updates are 
illegal, a Slave VMM does not need to check the updates because of our bus 
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management unit. Here, one small anomaly seen here, “sh proc” in Xen, presumably 
occurred due to a fortuitous cache alignment [Barham 03] since “slct TCP” in Xen 
produces better performance than does non-virtualized Linux. 
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FIGURE 5.9: PROCESS MICRO-BENCHMARKS ON OPEN DOMAIN 
 
In context switching micro-benchmarks measuring context switching time between 
different numbers of processes with different working set sizes, the average 
virtualization overhead of our approach was only 2.1%. For reference, our approach 
achieved 2.1 times higher average performance than did Xen and 20 times higher one 
than did UML. In particular, our approach significantly improved the context switch 
time for smaller working set sizes. This is because an OS on a Slave VMM is able to 
change a page table base without any emulation. While Xen software needs to check 
whether the changed page table base is illegal, a Slave VMM does not need to perform 
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the checking because of our bus management unit. 
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FIGURE 5.10: CONTEXT SWITCHING MICRO-BENCHMARKS ON OPEN DOMAIN 
 
The above measurements in terms of OS-level virtualization overhead imply 
application-level virtualization overhead. In terms of benchmarks which use few system 
calls, such as SPEC INT [Henning 06], the virtualization overhead of our approach 
would be almost the same as that of Xen or UML. In open embedded systems, our target 
applications, however, would seem to use a lot of system calls in order to achieve new 
services, such as device coordination among appliances. This means that our approach 
would greatly improve the performance of such applications in open embedded systems. 
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5.5.3 INTER-DOMAIN COMMUNICATION BANDWIDTH 
In order to examine IDC bandwidth degradation, we evaluated TCP bandwidth 
between two domains by using the ttcp benchmark [Muuss 85]. Both sender (TX) and 
receiver (RX) applications were configured using a socket buffer size of 128KB with a 
Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) of 1500 bytes to transfer 8 MB of data. In our approach, 
the virtualization overhead of network device drivers was less than 5%. Thus, the 
network device driver achieved almost the same bandwidth as the network device driver 
for non-virtualized Linux. It should be noted that we were not able to compare our 
approach with Xen and UML because the transferred data size configured in [Barham 
03] of 400MB was immeasurable in our evaluation environment. 
 
5.5.4 LINES OF CODE FOR VIRTUALIZATION  
In order to show the efficient implementation of our asymmetric virtualization, 
FIGURE 5.11 illustrates the Lines Of Code (LOC) of our approach, compared with those 
of other VMMs, Xen and UML. The modified LOC of virtualization software in our 
approach are 1.7 times smaller than that of Xen and 7.4 times smaller than that of UML. 
In addition, the modified LOC of network drivers in our approach are 2.0 times smaller 
than that of Xen and 3.7 times smaller than that of UML. This is because our bus 
management unit helps simplify virtualization software while other VMMs need extra 
functions, such as page table update, to handle multiple domains. 
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FIGURE 5.11: LINES OF CODE FOR VIRTUALIZATION 
 
5.6 SUMMARY 
We have presented our asymmetric virtualization, by which many OSs over the 
number of processors are securely executed under secure processor partitioning. Its 
most important feature is the achievement of both the allocation of a dedicated 
processor to a base domain and the domain protection of our bus management unit. In 
this way, asymmetric virtualization achieves fast, secure virtualization. We have 
designed asymmetric virtualization based on both ARM processors and Linux OSs. 
Moreover, our evaluations have shown its effectiveness, demonstrating three 
fundamental features: a successful example on three ARM processors, high performance 
and small code size. 
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6. 
CHAPTER 6                         
SECURE DYNAMIC PARTITIONING 
 
This chapter presents secure dynamic partitioning, by which the number of processors 
allocated to individual OSs makes it possible to be dynamically changed on SMP under 
secure processor partitioning. 
 
6.1 MOTIVATION 
Traditional SMP fails to execute multiple domains since they support only a single 
domain. Our secure dynamic partitioning helps support multiple domains required for 
open embedded systems on SMP. As mentioned in Chapter 5, conventional 
virtualization technologies, however, have a degree of security vulnerability [Hacker 
07]. In addition, the technologies unfit for embedded systems in terms of base features, 
such as performance overhead and memory footprint, since traditional virtualization 
technologies have been originally developed for computing systems. 
We introduce secure dynamic partitioning for SMP, which utilizes both secure 
processor partitioning (see Chapter 4) and asymmetric virtualization (see Chapter 5). 
The most important feature of secure dynamic partitioning is dynamic processor 
allocation, by which the number of processors allocated to individual OSs is 
dynamically changed under secure processor partitioning. In this way, open embedded 
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systems enable any number of domains to be securely executed even on SMP. It should 
be noted that asymmetric virtualization enables the number of processors to be 
dynamically changed by switching domains on individual processors of AMP. 
 
6.2 RELATED WORK 
Our research differs in a number of respects from the current body of research on 
dynamic partitioning. 
Major OS-level approaches include eSOL eT-Kernel [Gondo 07] and QNX BMP 
[Johnson 07]. Since these approaches use processor affinity settings to allow 
applications executed on an SMP OS to be run only on specified processors, they make 
it possible to change the number of processors assigned to an application. Thus, these 
approaches impose no performance overhead on applications. The execution of base and 
open applications on the same SMP OS, however, will result in critical security 
vulnerability.  
The major VMM-level approaches, as described in Section 4.2, include Xen 
[Barham 03] and LPAR [Armstrong 05]. These approaches provide any number of 
processors to applications through processor virtualization features. In addition, the 
approaches help enhance system security since they allow base applications to be 
separated from open applications at the OS level. Virtualization, however, results in 
unignorable performance degradation [Adams 06] [Barham 03], and there is a degree of 
security vulnerability in complex virtualization software [Hacker 07]. In accordance 
with the problem, recent work [Chen 08] [Seshadri 07] [Shinagawa 09] has proposed 
tiny virtualization software in order to reduce security vulnerability of virtualization 
software itself. 
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6.3 DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
FIGURE 6.1 shows an example of SMP used for mobile terminals. This example 
has three domains, a base domain for the execution of base applications and two open 
domains (A/B) for the execution of open applications, such as an operator domain and a 
manufacturer domain [Sun 06]. The base domain maintains at least one processor for its 
executions.  
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FIGURE 6.1: SMP FOR MOBILE TERMINALS 
 
For the scalable extension of base applications, all four processors are allocated to 
the base domain on the SMP OS. Further, where coordination is required between base 
and open applications, a processor allocated to the base domain (e.g., CPU3) will be 
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yielded to an open domain. As shown on the right-hand side of the figure, base 
applications can, for example, be executed separately on an SMP OS with three 
processors, while open applications are executed with the remaining processor. 
The SMP software structure includes two components: a context manager and a 
context handler. Here, a context refers to the register values required to restore a 
processor state. It should be noted that a context manager and a context handler are 
respectively extensions of a Master VMM and a Slave VMM (see Section 5.3.1 and 
5.3.2) in order to control SMP. In addition, inter-VMM communication (see Section 
5.3.3) is used between a context manager and context handlers. 
A context manager is run only on the base domain, and it manages base domain 
contexts, which are required to restore to the base domain any processors previously 
allocated to domains. It also manages all open domain contexts. Further, it controls 
self-transition management (see Section 6.3.1). It also sends to a context handler the 
context of a domain in which an execution is to be performed, ordering that the 
execution be made.  
A context handler is run on each open domain, and it conducts domain switching, 
from a current domain to a domain specified by the context manager. 
In transitions from, for example, a state with only a base domain to one with both a 
base domain and an open domain (e.g., Domain A in state transition (1) in FIGURE 6.1), 
the context manager saves the SMP OS context of the processor (here, CPU3) allocated 
for the execution of Domain A. Moreover, it restores the context of Domain A to the 
processor. As a result, the number of processors allocated to the base domain is 
dynamically reduced from four to three. FIGURE 6.2 summarizes this separation 
transition with required OS contexts. 
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FIGURE 6.2: SEPARATION FROM BASE DOMAIN 
 
In state transition (2) in FIGURE 6.1, e.g., in switching from Domain A to Domain 
B, the context manager sends the Domain B context to the context handler of Domain A, 
using inter-VMM communication. Moreover, it receives from the context handler the 
Domain A context, which had previously been saved. FIGURE 6.3 summarizes this 
switching transition with required OS contexts. It should be noted that this OS 
switching is equivalent to the function of asymmetric virtualization designed for AMP, 
as described in Chapter 5. 
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FIGURE 6.3: DOMAIN SWITCHING 
 
Finally, in state transition (3) in FIGURE 6.1, e.g., in switching from a state with 
both a base domain and an open domain to one with only a base domain, the context 
manager sends the SMP OS context of the processor performing executions in Domain 
B (i.e., CPU3) to the context handler of Domain B. Moreover, it receives from the 
context handler the Domain B context, which had previously been saved. As a result, 
the processor allocated for executions in a domain (i.e., CPU3) is restored to the base 
domain, and the number of processors allocated to the base domain is dynamically 
increased from three to four. FIGURE 6.4 summarizes this merge transition with required 
OS contexts. 
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FIGURE 6.4: MERGE TO BASE DOMAIN 
 
6.3.1 SELF-TRANSITION MANAGEMENT 
For separating a processor from a base domain (state transition (1) in FIGURE 6.1) 
and merging a processor back to the base domain (state transition (3) in FIGURE 6.1), a 
new operational control of processors, called self-transition management, is newly 
required. Self-transition management utilizes CPU Hotplug technology [Mwaikambo 
04] in order to control a base domain. CPU Hotplug technology, originally developed by 
Russell et al., is used to remove faulty processors from a system and add new processor 
substitutes to that system without stopping on-line operations. In ARM MPCore Linux, 
this technology allows unused processors to be put into a low power mode in order to 
reduce power consumption, as outlined in FIGURE 6.5. In other words, it simply 
suspends use of the processors with clock gating.  
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FIGURE 6.5: CPU HOTPLUG TECHNOLOGY 
 
FIGURE 6.6 shows the relationship between our self-transition management and 
CPU Hotplug technology. While the white boxes indicate the conventional operations of 
CPU Hotplug technology, the gray boxes indicate newly-added operations for 
self-transition management. When a processor in an idle state is put into a low power 
mode, the CPU Hotplug technology (i.e., the white boxes) implemented on ARM 
MPCore Linux requests the execution of a “CPU Hot Remove” processing. The “CPU 
Hot Remove” processing might involve, for example, 1) the migration of processes 
previously executed on that processor to other live processors, 2) a change in interrupt 
distribution to the processor, 3) deactivation of cache coherence (setting to the AMP 
mode), or 4) a processor’s waiting for an interrupt while clock gating is being conducted. 
After the processor receives a wake-up interrupt, the technology requests the execution 
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of a “CPU Hot Add” processing, such as the re-activation of cache coherence (setting to 
the SMP mode) or the return of a processor to an idle state. 
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FIGURE 6.6: SELF-TRANSITION MANAGEMENT 
 
Our self-transition management modifies the operational flow of CPU Hotplug 
technology instead of suspending processors. A context manager equips with three base 
domain context buffers in order to save the processor contexts corresponding to the 
three CPUs which make it possible to be separated from the base domain. In the case of 
separating a processor from the base domain and allocating it to an open domain (i.e., 
state transition (1) in FIGURE 6.6), it calls the cpu_down function (the API for a “CPU 
Hot Remove” processing) in order to request the processor to execute a “CPU Hotplug 
Remove” processing. Instead of making the processor wait for an interrupt, it saves the 
base domain context to the base domain context buffer corresponding to the processor. 
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In addition, it restores an open domain context to the processor in the platform_cpu_die 
function (the function that enters into a low power mode) called from the cpu_down 
function to the processor. In this way, our self-transition management enables 
processors which previously executed functions in the base domain to start to execute in 
domains. The key feature in our self-transition management is changing the value of the 
program counter saved in a base domain context to the program address which 
corresponds to the point at which waiting for an interrupt has been completed, i.e., the 
address that corresponds to the point just before “CPU Hot Add” processing 
commences. 
In the case of merging a processor from a domain back into the base domain (i.e., 
state transition (3) in FIGURE 6.6), the self-transition management requests the context 
manager to perform a domain context switch. The context manager orders the 
processor’s context handler to perform a domain context switch, providing the base 
domain context buffer to the context handler. The context handler then conducts a 
domain switch from the current domain to the base domain. Here, as mentioned earlier, 
since the value of the program counter is changed to the address directly preceding a 
“CPU Hot Add” processing, the processor executes the “CPU Hot Add” processing in 
the platform_cpu_die function. After that, it returns to an idle state in the base domain 
as if it had received a wake-up interrupt. In this way, the self-transition management 
enables processors which previously executed functions in domains to resume making 
executions in the base domain. 
 
6.3.2 UNIFIED VIRTUAL ADDRESS MAPPING 
For a state transition between domains, all registers in a processor have to be set 
CHAPTER 6: SECURE DYNAMIC PARTITIONING 
 
84
with the register values of a new domain context. Traditional embedded processors, 
including ARM MPCores [ARM 06], generally do not allow mode registers or control 
registers, such as a pointer register for use with a page table, to be simultaneously 
restored. Here, the domain switching code achieves state transitions between domains 
by setting all processor registers required for an OS (i.e., the OS context) to a processor. 
Thus, the code requires the execution of a consistent program flow even if the domain 
switching code executed in an OS before a state transition uses virtual addresses 
different from those in an OS after the state transition. In other words, unlike AMP 
software structures, it is difficult for the domain switching code to share with the same 
virtual addresses between OSs since a base domain and an open domain use different 
OSs, such as an SMP OS and an AMP OS. 
FIGURE 6.7 explains the issue with the domain switching code to achieve state 
transitions between domains. For example, in switching from Domain A to the base 
domain, the domain switching code changes the memory map of Domain A to that of 
the base domain by using a system instruction (e.g. the instruction at 0xC0001008). 
Because the virtual addresses to which the domain switching code of Domain A refers 
are not always pointing to those used for the domain switching code of the base domain, 
the domain switching code starts to execute an unexpected program flow after the code 
has changed the memory map. This, thus, results in unstable state transitions caused by 
losing control of the processors. 
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FIGURE 6.7: ISSUE ON DOMAIN TRANSITION 
 
In order to avoid this situation and achieve stable state transitions, we employed 
unified virtual address mapping, a technology for matching virtual addresses in the 
domain switching code shared between an OS used before a state transition and an OS 
used after that state transition. It simply enforces each processor to set the memory map 
of the domain switching code to a specific address. FIGURE 6.8 shows the mapping 
between physical addresses and virtual addresses in terms of both the SMP OS of the 
base domain and AMP OSs of open domains (i.e., Domains A and B). Unified virtual 
address mapping arranges common instructions and data used for the domain switching 
code in an area of the physical memory (e.g., 0x0e001000 for the common instructions 
in FIGURE 6.8 and 0x0f000000 for the common data) that is separate from areas of the 
physical memory used by the SMP OS and AMP OSs. Further, it assigns the common 
instructions and data to virtual addresses that are the same in both the SMP OS and the 
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AMP OSs (e.g., 0x0ffb0000 in FIGURE 6.8). In this way, unified virtual address 
mapping achieves stable operations. For example, the mapping enables a processor 
executing the domain switching code to fetch correct instructions or read correct data 
even after the setting of a pointer register to a page table. This is because the 
instructions and data used for the domain switching code are assigned to the same 
virtual addresses as those in both the OS used before a state transition and the OS used 
after that state transition. 
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(AMP OS A/B)
0xc0000000
0x00000000
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(SMP OS)
0xc0000000
0x00000000
Physical RAM
SMP OS
AMP OS A
AMP OS B
Common Insts.
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0x00000000
0x06000000
0x09000000
0x0c000000
Common Insts.
0xffb00000
Common Data
Kernel
Common Insts.
0xffb00000
Common Data
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0x0f000000
 
FIGURE 6.8: ADDRESS MAP FOR UNIFIED VIRTUAL ADDRESS MAPPING 
 
In addition, unified virtual address mapping is designed to prevent extra virtual 
addresses from being newly allocated to OSs. The key feature in unified virtual address 
mapping is the utilization of unused virtual addresses within the virtual address ranges 
allocated to I/O devices, which is possible because the size of common instructions and 
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data is a small number of kilobytes. Thus, no extra virtual addresses are required for 
mapping the domain switching code. 
It should be noted that the only security risk of our secure dynamic partitioning is 
the transition to merge from a domain to the base domain. If a malicious domain should 
compromise the domain switching code, the malicious domain would be merged to the 
trusted base domain. However, as illustrated in Section 4.3 and Section 5.3.2, our bus 
management unit enables malicious domains to be prevented from modifying the code 
through data cache and from changing restored OS contexts.  
 
6.4 EVALUATION 
TABLE 6.1 summarizes our SMP evaluation environment, called MPCore [ARM 
06]. MPCore is an embedded symmetric multi-core processor which equips with four 
ARM processors. FIGURE 6.9 shows our evaluation board with an MPCore processor. 
 
TABLE 6.1: SMP EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT 
Item Feature 
SoC MPCore (MP11 CPU x 4) @ 130nm 
Cache I$: 32KB, D$: 32KB per MP11 CPU 
Clock frequency ARM: 240MHz, Bus: 35MHz 
OS Linux 2.6.7 / SMP OS x 1, AMP OS x 2 
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FIGURE 6.9: MPCORE AS SMP EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT 
 
FIGURE 6.10 outlines the evaluation implementation of our secure dynamic 
partitioning, which supports one SMP Linux OS (i.e., the base domain for base 
applications) and two AMP Linux OSs (i.e., two open domains) on an MPCore. Thus, it 
enables two processors to be flexibly allocated from the SMP OS to AMP OSs or to be 
de-allocated from AMP OSs to the SMP OS. Evaluations show that our secure dynamic 
partitioning actually worked on SMP (see Section 6.4.1). In addition, the dynamic 
partitioning achieved higher performance (see Section 6.4.2, and 6.4.3), faster state 
transition time (Section 6.4.4), and lower code size (see Section 6.4.5) than did other 
approaches.  
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FIGURE 6.10: EVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION OF DYNAMIC PARTITIONING  
 
6.4.1 SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE FOR DYNAMIC PARTITIONING 
FIGURE 6.11 demonstrates a successful example of the application of our secure 
dynamic partitioning. In normal operation, a large-screen video application (i.e., a base 
application) which requires the full performance of four CPUs runs on the base domain. 
In response to a user request for the execution of an open application, a control 
application removes a CPU from the base domain, allocating the CPU to an open 
domain. Then, the video application on the base domain is scaled to a medium-screen 
one which requires only the performance of three CPUs. On the other hand, the open 
domain to which the CPU is allocated executes the requested open application. 
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FIGURE 6.11: SECURE DYNAMIC PARTITIONING ON MPCORE 
 
6.4.2 SCALABLE EXTENSION OF BASE APPLICATIONS 
In order to study that a base domain has the ability on dynamically changing its 
performance for the scalable extension of base applications, FIGURE 6.12 shows 
allocation of MultiProcessor Dhrystone MIPS (MP DMIPS) to the base domain and an 
open domain. We used MP DMIPS in order to check whether our approach correctly 
allocates a CPU to an open domain or de-allocates a CPU from the domain because the 
MP DMIPS is simply proportional to the number of CPUs contained in an OS. As a 
result, we have confirmed that state transition (1) shown in FIGURE 6.1 reduces total 
performance in the base domain by an amount corresponding to that of a single 
processor while the amount of reduced performance is gained in the open domain. 
Further, with state transition (3) in FIGURE 6.1, performance in the base domain is 
increased back to the previous level. 
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FIGURE 6.12: SCALABLE EXTENSION OF BASE APPLICATIONS 
 
6.4.3 VIRTUALIZATION PERFORMANCE ON BASE DOMAIN 
In order to examine that secure dynamic partitioning affects the performance of a 
base domain, FIGURE 6.13 and FIGURE 6.14 show the evaluation results for LMbench 
[Mcvoy 96] processes and context switching micro-benchmarks executed in a base 
domain. The evaluation conditions are the same as Section 5.5.2. As shown in the 
figures, the base domain achieves nearly the same performance as does the 
base-reference SMP Linux. This cannot be said for conventional virtualization software.  
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FIGURE 6.13: PROCESS MICRO-BENCHMARKS ON BASE DOMAIN 
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FIGURE 6.14: CONTEXT SWITCHING MICRO-BENCHMARKS ON BASE DOMAIN 
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Two small anomalies seen here, signal handling in Xen and two processes of 16KB 
array size each with our approach, presumably occurred due to a fortuitous cache 
alignment [Barham 03]. It should be noted that we have confirmed that the performance 
of an open domain on this SMP achieved the same performance as did asymmetric 
virtualization on AMP. 
 
6.4.4 DOMAIN TRANSITION TIME 
TABLE 6.2 shows times required for the state transitions shown in FIGURE 6.1, 
compared with that of CPU Hotplug technology.  
 
TABLE 6.2: STATE TRANSITION TIME OF DYNAMIC PARTITIONING 
Time 
Item 
Proposed CPU Hotplug 
Separation from the base domain 2.5ms 1.5ms 
Switching to an open domain 0.5ms N/A 
Merge to the base domain 4.5ms 2.5ms 
 
Here, “separation from the base domain,” “switching to an open domain,” and 
“merge to the base domain” correspond, respectively to state transitions (1), (2) and (3) 
in FIGURE 6.1. The time required for state transitions is quite low (of a 
single-millisecond order). Further, the greatest time difference with CPU Hotplug 
technology is only 2.0ms. This small transition time of the order of a millisecond helps 
execute soft real-time applications, such as video applications, continuously, as shown 
in FIGURE 6.11. 
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6.4.5 LINES OF CODE FOR DYNAMIC PARTITIONING 
TABLE 6.3 demonstrates that our secure dynamic partitioning is implemented with 
a small binary code size (i.e., less than 40KB). The binary code size for common text 
(instructions) and data is also small, being implemented in only 9.2KB. The increases in 
binary code size of SMP Linux and AMP Linux are only 1.5% and 1.3%, respectively, 
over that for un-modified OSs. In terms of Lines of Code (LOC), the modified LOC 
values of SMP Linux and AMP Linux are 1549 LOC and 1145 LOC, respectively. This 
means that their modified LOC are almost the same as or less than the modified LOC of 
virtualization software without any functions for changing the number of processors 
within a domain (e.g., it is almost the same as the LOC of Xen and 4 times smaller than 
that of UML). 
 
TABLE 6.3: LINES OF CODE FOR DYNAMIC PARTITIONING 
Linux Text Data BSS 
Common
text 
Common 
data 
Total 
SMP +11.2 +1.6 +16.2 +38.2 
AMP +6.6 +1.1 +16.1 
+0.3 +8.9 
+32.9 
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
We have presented our secure dynamic partitioning, by which the number of 
processors allocated to individual OSs makes it possible to be dynamically changed on 
SMP. Its most important feature is dynamic processor allocation utilizing secure 
processor partitioning. In this way, secure dynamic partitioning achieves fast, flexible 
secure partitioning even on SMP. We have designed secure dynamic partitioning based 
on both ARM symmetric multi-core processors and Linux OSs. Moreover, our 
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evaluations have shown its effectiveness, demonstrating three fundamental features: a 
successful example on ARM MPCore, high performance, low state transition time, and 
small code size. 
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7. 
CHAPTER 7                         
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has presented a bold new paradigm, known as open embedded systems. 
While traditional embedded systems provide only closed base applications to users, 
open embedded systems allow the users to use open applications as well as base 
applications. Platforms used for open embedded systems require the achievement of two 
major design objectives: the scalable extension of base applications and the secure 
execution of open applications. 
The primary contributions of this dissertation are the attainment of a multi-core 
processor platform for open embedded systems. Four innovative techniques feature our 
multi-core platform: (1) seamless communication, by which legacy base applications 
designed for a single-core processor make it possible to be executed over multiple 
processors without any software modifications; (2) secure processor partitioning, by 
which OSs are mutually protected on separate processors; (3) asymmetric virtualization, 
by which many OSs over the number of processors are securely executed under secure 
processor partitioning; and (4) secure dynamic partitioning as an extension of secure 
processor partitioning, by which the number of processors allocated to individual OSs 
makes it possible to be dynamically changed on SMP under secure processor 
partitioning.  
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Evaluations show the effectiveness of the four innovative techniques. Seamless 
communication achieves a successful example with actual mobile terminal software, 
high performance and small code size. Secure processor partitioning provides excellent 
hardware specifications and a high security level. Asymmetric virtualization achieves a 
successful example on three ARM processors, high performance and small code size. 
Secure dynamic partitioning demonstrates a successful example on an MPCore, high 
performance, low state transition time, and small code size. As a result, our multi-core 
processor platform is ideally suited to open embedded systems since our platform 
satisfies two important requirements for open embedded systems. 
In future work, we would proceed with the research in three technology directions: 
the enhancement of data security, the support of many-core processors, and the 
application to reliable embedded systems. First, the secure integration of data security 
techniques, such as XOM [Lie 00], AEGIS [Suh 05], TPM [TCG 06], and SENSS 
[Zhang 05], with our platform would be a big challenge since keys need to be perfectly 
protected from open applications. Second, in many-core processors [Vangal 08], our 
centralized bus management unit needs to be extended to distributed network 
management units since each processor is connected with an inter-connection network 
in a chip. Specifically, the consistent setting of distributed network management units 
would be a difficult challenge since many processors that belong to open domains need 
to be independently checked. Finally, the concept of this work would seem to be 
extensible to reliable embedded systems, such as automotive systems In automotive 
systems enhancing real-time responses, however, would be an important challenge since 
open applications interfere with base applications through the shared bus [Abe 07]. 
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